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Abstract
We propose a multimodal scheme, GazeTouchPass, that
combines gaze and touch for shoulder-surfing resistant
user authentication on mobile devices. GazeTouchPass
allows passwords with multiple switches between input
modalities during authentication. This requires attackers
to simultaneously observe the device screen and the user’s
eyes to find the password. We evaluate the security and us-
ability of GazeTouchPass in two user studies. Our findings
show that GazeTouchPass is usable and significantly more
secure than single-modal authentication against basic and
even advanced shoulder-surfing attacks.
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Introduction
With mobile devices enabling ubiquitous access to sensi-
tive information, there is a need to protect access to such
devices. Meanwhile, authentication schemes are prone to
shoulder-surfing attacks [20], where a bystander observes a
user while authenticating. The attacker then gets hold of the
device and tries to authenticate and access sensitive data.
Recent work proposed schemes that are more resistant to
observations [11, 25]. However in most cases, attacking
state of the art schemes involves observing only one entity
– the phone – in preparation for an attack.
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Figure 1: GazeTouchPass uses
gaze and touch for authentication
on smartphones. This requires
attackers to observe both the
user’s eyes and the touchscreen.
At the same time high-resolution front-facing cameras made
it possible to track users’ gaze on mobile devices [12, 13,
14, 21, 27]. These advances took gaze-based authentica-
tion from desktop systems [4, 5, 16], to mobile devices [17].
This work combines gaze and touch input for secure user
authentication on off-the-shelf mobile devices.
We propose a novel multimodal scheme, GazeTouchPass,
that makes mobile user authentication more robust against
shoulder-surfing by requiring attackers to simultaneously
observe both the user’s eyes and the phone (Figure 1).
GazeTouchPass combines gaze and touch input into multi-
modal passwords (e.g. left-3-right-4).
The contributions of this work are two-fold. First, we intro-
duce the concept and the implementation of GazeTouch-
Pass, a novel multimodal authentication scheme that se-
cures mobile devices against classic and even advanced
shoulder-surfing attacks. Second, we report on an evalua-
tion of the system’s usability and security, and compare it
to state-of-the-art schemes. Our findings show that multi-
modal authentication using gaze and touch is significantly
more secure than single-modal authentication against basic
and even advanced shoulder-surfing attacks.
Threat Models
GazeTouchPass addresses two threat models, in both mod-
els the user is in a public space that is not under the control
of the attacker. The attacker is familiar with the system and
knows how to provide a password.
Iterative attacks. The attacker can observe the user sev-
eral times (e.g. a colleague at work) from different view-
points. The attacker exclusively focuses on one modality
per observation – on the users’ eyes (eyes-view) and then
on the input on the screen (phone-view), or vice versa. The
challenges of this attack are to (a) correctly remember both
sequences and to (b) correctly combine them later.
Side attacks. The attacker observes the user while au-
thenticating once (e.g. in a subway) from an angle that al-
lows the user’s eyes as well as the user’s input on the touch
screen to be observed. The distance between the attacker
and the user is close enough to see the touchscreen, but
far enough to reduce the effort of switching focus back and
forth between the user’s eyes and the device’s display.
GazeTouchPass: Multimodal Passwords
Based on these threat models we propose GazeTouchPass,
a multimodal authentication scheme in which users define
four symbols, each can be entered either via touch (a digit
between 0 and 9) or via gaze (gazing to the left and to the
right). Consecutive gaze inputs to the same direction would
then need to be separated by a gaze to the front.
We expect that the more switches between input modal-
ities are used within a single password, the more difficult
it will be to observe it. For example, we expect: “1-left-2-
right” (3-switches) to be more secure than “1-2-left-right”
(1-switch). As for side attacks, each switch in input modality
is equivalent to a switch of the attacker’s focus between the
touchscreen and the eyes. In case of iterative attacks, as
switches between modalities increase, so do the possible
combinations of observations from the eyes-view and the
phone-view. Examples of passwords with different number
of modality switches are shown in Table 1.
The login interface consists of 10 buttons similar to a com-
mon 10-digit keypad (see Figure 1). Users log in by touch-
ing digits and moving their eyes. The system is implemented
as an Android application and does not require any addi-
tional hardware. The user’s face and eyes are first detected
using the Viola-Jones detector [24] through the device’s
front-facing camera. On top we then use a calibration-free
gaze estimation approach similar to a method recently intro-
duced for interaction with public displays [28]. Our method
calculates the distance between the center of the face and
the pupil for each eye. Discrete gaze directions are then
estimated based on the ratio between both distances.
Condition Examples
0-switches
(baseline)
1-2-3-4
left-right-left-left
1-switch
left-1-2-3
1-2-left-right
2-switches
left-1-left-right
left-1-2-right
3-switches
1-left-2-right
left-1-right-2
Table 1: We studied the effect of
the number of switches between
gaze input and touch input. It is
expected that the more switches
between modalities a password
has, the more resistant it is to
shoulder-surfing. A password with
0-switches in input modalities is
considered the baseline as it
represents a single modal
password consisting of either digits
only or gaze gestures only.
Usability Study
The aim of this study is to analyze the usability of Gaze-
TouchPass and to collect video recordings of gaze and
touch input for the subsequent security study. In a repeated
measures experiment, each participant performed 16 au-
thentications (4 passwords × 4 conditions) using randomly
generated passwords. We recruited 13 participants (9 fe-
males), aged between 21 and 35 years (M = 25.23,
SD = 3.8). We logged all login attempts and recorded the
participants using three HD video cameras (see Figure 2).
Each participant performed a training run per condition, to
get acquainted with the system. These runs were excluded
from further analyses. At each authentication attempt, the
experimenter read out the password to be entered accord-
ing to a previously generated, randomized list. Participants
repeated entry in case of false login. The study was con-
cluded with a semi-structured interview. We evaluated the
system’s usability based on input speed and error rate.
Input Speed. We measured the time taken to input the
passwords. We excluded 3 out of 72 input time measure-
ments prior to analysis as outliers (> µ + 3×SD). No
Figure 2: The usability study setup. Cameras A and B simulate an
iterative attack (observing the phone screen and user’s eyes
separately), while Camera C simulates a side attack (observing
the phone screen and user’s eyes simultaneously).
significant main effects were found for number of modal-
ity switches on authentication time (p > 0.05). Figure 3
suggests that mean authentication times do not vary greatly
among different number of modality switches.
Error Rate. We also logged the number of failed login at-
tempts, which were either due to incorrect input or false
detection by the system. A Pearson chi-square test showed
no significant effect of number of modality switches on error
rate χ2(30) = 33, p = 0.32. Figure 5 shows that there
were fewer errors in the case of passwords with 3-switches.
While providing multiple consecutive gaze gestures can be
error prone, having 3 switches in a 4-digit password can be
achieved only by alternating gaze gestures and digits.
Figure 3: Mean authentication times for passwords with different
numbers of modality switches. Authentication times do not vary
significantly among different number of modality switches. Overall
mean authentication time is 3.1 seconds (SD=1.3).
(a)
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Figure 4: (a) A participant
observing the side-view during a
side attack. (b) A participant
observing the eyes-view as part of
an iterative attack. (c) When
performing iterative attacks,
participants noted the pauses
between gaze gestures then tried
to fill the gaps with digits observed
through the phone-view.
Qualitative Feedback. Six out of 13 participants reported
they would use GazeTouchPass as a primary authentica-
tion scheme. Nine reported that they would not use it for
daily unlocking, but rather for insecure situations or to pro-
tect sensitive data, such as their online banking apps. One
participant indicated that she would be willing to use Gaze-
TouchPass for a one-time unlock (e.g. when switching the
phone on). Four participants said they would not be willing
to do anything extra for higher security; two of them added
that they do not use any lock mechanism on their phones.
Security Study
In the security study, we used the videos recorded from the
preceding study to evaluate the security of GazeTouchPass.
Following a repeated measures design, participants at-
tacked passwords with all four possible number of switches
and observed from all views using the videos recorded dur-
ing the usability study. Every participant attacked 8 pass-
words of each condition of n-switches – half of which were
side attacks (side-view), while the others were iterative at-
tacks (phone-view and eyes-view) where the experimenter
alternated the order of the observed view. Each participant
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Figure 5: Number of attempts before a successful entry. Errors
are less for passwords with 3-switches; consecutive gaze gestures
can be error prone, while 3-switches in an n=4 password can be
only achieved by alternating gaze and touch input.
attacked 32 passwords. The order of videos was random-
ized per participant. To avoid learning effects, no participant
attacked the same password from different views.
We recruited 13 participants (6 females), aged between 21
and 33 years (M = 24.2, SD = 3.4), through mailing
lists, none of whom had participated in the usability study.
Participants were compensated with a 10 Euro voucher. In
addition, all participants took part in a draw for an additional
20 Euro voucher, where chances of winning increased with
the number of successfully attacked passwords.
The experimenter introduced the study procedure, the task,
and the rewarding mechanism. After explaining the system,
participants had the chance to try and get acquainted with
the app themselves. They were given draft papers, then the
experimenter started playing the videos. Based on their ob-
servations, participants provided up to three guesses (Fig-
ure 6). The study was concluded with a questionnaire and
a semi-structured interview. In total, participants performed
13 × 32 = 416 attacks with up to three guesses each.
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Figure 6: Success rate when attacking passwords entered using
GazeTouchPass. The more switches in input modality per
password, the less likely it is successfully attacked. Side attacks
are always less successful than iterative attacks due to the
difficulty of continuously switching focus back and forth from the
eyes to the touchscreen.
System
Login
time
GazeTouchPass
3-switches 3.1s
2-switches 3.3s
1-switches 3.0s
0-switches 3.0s
EyePassShapes [6] 12.5s
EyePIN [8] 48.5s
CGP [10] 36.7s
EyePassword [16] 9.2s-12.1s
Liu et al. [17] 9.6s
PhoneLock [1] 12.2s - 28.2s
SpinLock [2] 10.8s - 20.1s
TimeLock [3] 10s
ColorLock [3] 10s
XSide [7]
front 1-switch start 3.9s
front 1-switch end 3.7s
front 2-switches 3.8s
back 1-switch start 3.8s
back 1-switch end 4.1s
back 2-switches 4.0s
Table 2: Authentication times using
GazeTouchPass compared to
state-of-the-art schemes that use
gaze-based authentication
[6, 8, 10, 16, 17], input-splitting
(e.g. XSide [7]) and multiple
modalities [1, 2, 3].
Successful Attacks. For every attack we calculated the
Levenshtein distance between the guesses and the cor-
rect password. Only the guess closest to the correct pass-
word was considered for further analysis. Moreover, we
calculated the overall success rate in attacking passwords
for each number of modality switches and for each attack
type (iterative attack vs side attack). An attack is successful
if at least one guess matched the correct password. Fig-
ure 6 summarizes the successful attack rate against pass-
words with different number of modality switches, observed
through the side-view or through the phone-view and the
eyes-view.
A repeated measures ANOVA showed significant main ef-
fects for number of modality switches on attack success
(F3,36 = 3.86, p < 0.05). This suggests that distance be-
tween the guesses and the correct password depends on
the modality switches. Post-hoc analysis using Bonferroni
correction showed a significant difference (p < 0.05) in
attack success for passwords with 0-switches (M = 1.25,
SD = 0.14) compared to those with 3-switches (M = 1.9,
SD = 0.1). This means guesses against passwords with
0-switches in modality (baseline) are closer to the correct
pattern than those with 3-switches. The other pairs did not
show any significant differences (p > 0.05).
There were significant main effects for the view angle on
attack success (F1,12 = 51.05, p < 0.0001). No inter-
action effects were found between the number of modality
switches and the view angle (p > 0.05). Post-hoc analysis
using Bonferroni correction revealed that there was a signif-
icant difference (p < 0.0001) in attack success for pass-
words attacked iteratively (M = 1.38, SD = 0.138) com-
pared to passwords attacked from the side (M = 1.913,
SD = 0.123). This suggests that guesses against pass-
words observed iteratively are closer to the correct pass-
word compared to those observed from the side.
Qualitative Feedback. When asked how easy it was to at-
tack passwords for each view (5-point Likert scale; 1=Very
easy; 5=Very difficult), participants found side attacks to be
very difficult (Med = 5, SD = 0.66), while iterative attacks
were perceived to be easier (Med = 3, SD = 0.96). Eight
participants expressed that attacking touch-only and gaze-
only passwords were easiest. One participant reported it
was easier to break passwords with consecutive inputs of
the same modality. There was a disagreement among par-
ticipants in which modality it was more difficult to observe.
While some found gaze input to be more difficult to observe
than touch input, others found gaze-input easier. Partici-
pants reported side attacks to be harder as it was difficult to
concentrate on the eyes and the display at the same time.
Three participants said that they had trouble finding the
right order during iterative attacks. They also reported that it
is harder to attack passwords entered quickly. It is expected
that users will login faster as they use the system more of-
ten, making the system even more secure.
Discussion
GazeTouchPass is particularly secure against side attacks
(only 15%-21% success rate). Iterative attacks are compli-
cated but possible in optimal conditions (23%-46%), given
that the adversary paid attention to all inputs and noted the
gaps between them (see Figure 4c). It should be noted that
we assume the attacker knows how the observed system
works. The proposed threat models are realistic yet ensure
optimal conditions. Nevertheless, GazeTouchPass is more
secure than most comparable systems (see Table 3).
System
Successful
attacks
GazeTouchPass
3-switches (Side) 15%
3-switches (Iterative) 23%
2-switches (Side) 15%
2-switches (Iterative) 37%
1-switches (Side) 21%
1-switches (Iterative) 46%
0-switches (Side) 25%
0-switches (Iterative) 63%
EyePassShapes [6] 42%
EyePIN [8] 55%
XSide [7]
front 1-switch start 38%
front 1-switch end 13%
front 2-switches 28%
back 1-switch start 19%
back 1-switch end 16%
back 2-switches 9%
Table 3: Successful attack rates
using GazeTouchPass compared
to state-of-the-art schemes that
use gaze-based
authentication [6, 8] and
input-splitting (e.g. XSide [7]).
Some relevant systems were
excluded from this table as their
security was not evaluated in a way
comparable to our
studies [1, 2, 3, 10, 16, 17].
Mean authentication time using GazeTouchPass is approx-
imately 3.1 seconds. While this is slower than less secure
schemes (von Zezschwitz et al. [26] report 1.5 seconds for
PINs and 3.13 seconds for patterns), GazeTouchPass is
faster than security-optimized state-of-the-art authentica-
tion systems (see Table 2). Overall, and as several partici-
pants indicated, GazeTouchPass can be particularly useful
as a secondary authentication mechanism that users can
choose to opt to when feeling observed (e.g. public setting),
or when accessing critical data (e.g. online banking).
GazeTouchPass achieves a balance between security and
usability, with low authentication times and high observation
resistance. Tables 2 and 3 show that it is faster and more
secure than gaze-based schemes [6, 8, 10, 16]. Comparing
GazeTouchPass to mobile-based schemes that use multiple
modalities, we found that although the security of Phone-
Lock [1], SpinLock [2], TimeLock [3], ColorLock [3] and the
system by Liu et al. [17] was not evaluated in a way compa-
rable to our studies, our system requires shorter login times
(see Table 2), and uses a higher password space (12n)
than that of [17]. XSide [7] splits the input using a double-
sided touchscreen. Still GazeTouchPass is faster and can
work on off-the-shelf mobile devices without additional
hardware. Similarly, the number of switches in an XSide
password influences its security; in most cases GazeTouch-
Pass is more resistant to observations (see Table 3).
Limitations and Future Work
While GazeTouchPass shows that multimodal passwords
are significantly more secure than single-modal ones, iter-
ative attacks are still possible and perceived to be relatively
easy to perform. Future work should focus on increasing re-
sistance to iterative attacks while maintaining usability. One
possible approach is to introduce a random cue [19] to the
user that would complicate attempts to combine observa-
tions from multiple views. We will also study the memorabil-
ity and practical password space of GazeTouchPass.
Video-based eye tracking has its known limitations; vary-
ing light conditions, reflections of eye glasses and heavy
makeup can affect the quality of eye tracking [18]. For this
reason we opted for simple eye gestures that can be ro-
bustly detected by frontal-cameras. However, the use of
better eye tracking equipment (e.g. infrared light sources
and sensors) can enable a wider range of eye movements
to be detected robustly. Future systems can use different
types of eye movements. For example, the smooth pursuits
eye movement has recently gained attention in enabling
calibration-free gaze-based interaction [5, 9, 15, 22, 23].
Conclusion
In this paper we introduced multimodal authentication com-
bining gaze and touch on mobile devices. GazeTouchPass
is significantly more secure than single modal systems, par-
ticularly against side attacks due to having to quickly switch
focus between phone and eyes. Its usability compares
favourably to state-of-the-art schemes. Our conclusion is
that the use of multiple modalities can greatly enhance the
security of authentication systems against advanced as well
as basic threat models, while maintaining high usability.
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